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Three kinds of collective attitudes 
Christian List	  
Abstract: This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of 
collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They 
differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes – e.g., whether 
they are “reducible” to individual attitudes – but also in the roles they play 
in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to 
distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the 
social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation. 
1. Introduction 
We frequently ascribe intentional attitudes, such as beliefs and preferences, not just to 
individuals, but also to collectives. We speak of what the opinion of a jury is, what the 
electorate prefers, what Amnesty International is committed to, what Google wants, 
what the government intends, what the community of scientists thinks, what the 
markets expect, what “ordinary folk” believe and prefer, and so on (for discussions of 
collective attitudes of various kinds, see, e.g., Arrow 1951/1963, Quinton 1975, 
Gilbert 1989, Pettit 2001, ch. 5, 2003a,b, List and Pettit 2002, 2011, Tollefsen 
2002a,b, Goldman 2010, Dietrich and List 2010, Schweikard and Schmid 2013).  
Ascriptions of attitudes to collectives occur not only in informal talk. They also occur 
in the social sciences: for example, in the study of cultures, identities, and social 
norms; in explanations of how groups or societies solve coordination and equilibrium-
selection problems; in the theory of the firm, where firms and corporations are often 
modelled as unitary actors with beliefs and preferences of their own; in international-
relations theory, where entire states are sometimes modelled as unitary agents with 
objectives and beliefs (as in game-theoretic models of the Cold War); in social choice 
theory, which investigates the aggregation of individual preferences and judgments 
into collective ones and looks at whether such collective attitudes can be “rational”; 
and in the literature on joint intentions, the intentions underpinning joint actions, such 
as going for a walk together, carrying a piano downstairs together, collaborating on a 
shared project (see, among others, Gilbert 1989, Searle 1995, Bratman 1999, and 
Tuomela 2007). 
What are collective attitudes? Are they just summaries of individual attitudes, or are 
they held by collectives as agents in their own right? And do all collective attitudes 
fall under the same kind, whether held by the US Supreme Court, the current 
generation of teenagers, the collaborators in a project, or the financial markets? Or are 
there different kinds of such attitudes? 
The aim of this paper is to offer a comparison of three different kinds of collective 
attitudes. I call them “aggregate”, “common”, and “corporate attitudes”. Common 
usage often vacillates between them. As I will argue, attitudes of the three kinds differ 
not only in their relationship to individual attitudes – especially in whether and how 
they are “reducible” to individual attitudes – but also in the roles they play in relation 
to the collectives to which they are ascribed. For example, only common and 
corporate attitudes play direct social roles within the collectives in question, while 
aggregate attitudes need not be more than constructs made by an observer. Further, 
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only corporate attitudes carry a commitment to group agency, while aggregate and 
common attitudes can be ascribed to collectives independently of their agential status. 
Of course, like all intentional attitudes, each of the three kinds of attitudes can be 
subdivided further into a variety of subcategories: cognitive and conative attitudes, as 
well as more complicated types. There can be aggregate beliefs and desires, common 
beliefs and desires, and corporate beliefs and desires. Each of these, in turn, could be 
binary (such as a belief or desire simpliciter) or come in degrees (such as a degree of 
belief or desire). Similarly, there can be aggregate fears and hopes, common fears and 
hopes, and corporate fears and hopes. The taxonomy of collective attitudes on which I 
am focusing here does not replace existing taxonomies of intentional attitudes but 
simply emphasizes a dimension that is not appreciated as widely as it should be: the 
aggregate-common-corporate dimension. 
The failure to distinguish the three kinds of collective attitudes can lead to confusion, 
in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the main message of this paper is 
an appeal for disambiguation. Sections 2, 3, and 4 focus on aggregate, common, and 
corporate attitudes, respectively. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. Although 
the paper is, to a large extent, a review of existing work, I hope the comparison 
between the three kinds of collective attitudes will prove useful. 
2. Aggregate attitudes 
2.1 Definition 
The first kind of collective attitude is well described in an often-quoted passage by 
Anthony Quinton (1975, p. 17): 
“Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions and attitudes … But these ways 
of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe mental predicates to a 
group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its 
members … To say that the industrial working class is determined to 
resist anti-trade union laws is to say that all or most industrial workers are 
so minded.” 
In line with Quinton’s remarks, an aggregate attitude (of a collective) is an aggregate 
or summary of the attitudes of the individual members of the collective, produced by 
some aggregation rule or statistical criterion. (Gilbert 1989, following Quinton, calls 
such attitudes summative.) For example, if the attitudes to be aggregated are beliefs on 
some proposition p, and the aggregation rule is the majority rule, then the aggregate 
belief on p is the majority belief on p. So, p is believed in aggregate if and only if a 
majority of the individuals believe p. Similarly, if the attitudes to be aggregated are 
credences (degrees of belief) in p, and the aggregation rule is the linear average, then 
the aggregate credence in p is the linear average of the individuals’ credences in p.  
Depending on the types of attitudes to be aggregated (e.g., whether they are binary or 
come in degrees), a number of different aggregation rules are available, for instance 
sub-, simple-, and super-majoritarian rules, linear and geometrical averages, and 
median rules. It should be clear that the aggregate attitudes of a collective always 
depend on the aggregation rule used. 
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We make ascriptions of aggregate attitudes, for example, when we say that the 
community of climate scientists believes in human-induced climate change, that the 
current generation of teenagers likes Facebook, or that the markets expect the value of 
Apple stocks to go down. Aggregate attitudes are frequently referred to in political 
science and sociology, where public opinion, for instance in politics, is understood as 
the aggregate of individual opinions on the relevant issues. 
2.2 Direct versus behavioural aggregation 
There are two ways in which we may arrive at aggregate attitudes: through direct 
aggregation and through behavioural aggregation. In the case of direct aggregation, 
the aggregate attitudes of a collective are determined, directly, as a function or 
summary statistic of the corresponding individual attitudes. This is the familiar route 
by which we ascribe aggregate attitudes to populations on the basis of votes, opinion 
polls, surveys, or focus groups. Here, individual attitudes are elicited and then 
explicitly summarized. Direct aggregation has been extensively studied in public-
opinion research, in theories of judgment aggregation and belief merging, and in 
social choice theory more generally; consequently, I need not say much about it here 
(for a survey, see List 2013; see also Dietrich and List 2010). 
Behavioural aggregation is perhaps less familiar. In this case, the aggregate attitudes 
are determined, not directly as a function of the corresponding individual attitudes, 
but indirectly, as an “emergent” property of the individuals’ patterns of behaviour, 
which, in turn, may reveal their attitudes. The best-known examples of behavioural 
aggregation can be found in prediction markets and financial markets more generally 
(on prediction markets, see, e.g., Sunstein 2006 and Hanson 2013). Here the 
aggregate beliefs and preferences of the market are reflected in market prices. For 
example, companies which are considered more desirable or which are believed to 
produce higher future revenues tend have higher stock prices than companies with a 
weaker standing in people’s opinions.  
Since behavioural aggregation is less well known than direct aggregation, it is worth 
giving an example: the Iowa Presidential Election Market. In the run-up to each 
United States presidential election, participants in this market can buy and sell bets on 
the election outcome. For example, a Democratic bet yields a payoff of 1 US$ after 
Election Day if the Democratic candidate wins and a payoff of 0 US$ otherwise. A 
Republican bet yields a payoff of 1 US$ if the Republican candidate wins and a 
payoff of 0 US$ otherwise.  
Figure 1 (from the webpage of the 2012 Iowa Presidential Election Market) shows the 
market prices of the Democratic and Republican bets between January 2011 and 
Election Day in November 2012. The market prices for each bet fluctuated 
considerably over time, depending on how market participants viewed the candidates’ 
prospects. For instance, when Obama was perceived to do worse than Romney in the 
first televised debate between the two, the price of the Democratic bet went down and 
that of the Republican bet went up, reflecting a change in the market’s beliefs about 
the candidates’ prospects. During most of the campaign, however, the Democratic bet 
had a higher price than the Republican one.   
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Figure 1: Market prices of the Democratic (top curve) and Republican (bottom 
curve) bets in the run-up to the 2012 US Presidential Election 
(Source: http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/graphs/graph_PRES12_WTA.cfm) 
It is easy to see how the price at which market participants are willing to buy or sell 
each bet reflects a subjective probability (credence) for the proposition that the 
relevant candidate will win. Suppose you are one of the market participants in the run-
up to the election, and you assign a subjective probability of x (a real number between 
0 and 1) to the event that Obama will win. Your expected payoff for the Democratic 
bet will then be  
x US$ = x * 1 US$ + (1-x) * 0 US$. 
If x is 0.6, for example, your expected payoff for the Democratic bet will be 60 cents. 
Consequently, if you are a risk-neutral expected payoff maximizer (as we here assume 
for simplicity), you will be willing to pay up to 60 cents for the Democratic bet, and 
you will be willing to sell it for no less than 60 cents. Your decision to buy or sell the 
bet is thus, in part, indicative of your degree of belief in the proposition that Obama 
will win. The bet’s overall market price can be interpreted as reflecting the market’s 
aggregate credence in that proposition: a price of 50 cents, for instance, as reflecting a 
credence of ½. The more likely Obama’s victory looked prior to the election, the more 
the price approximated 1 US$, reflecting a credence approximating certainty. 
Prediction markets can, in principle, be designed for any proposition that has a 
verifiable truth-value at some future time. Ideally, this truth-value should be 
exogenously determined, rather than influenced by the market participants 
themselves, but I will set this complication aside. Prediction markets can also be 
designed for “compound” propositions, with logical connectives such as “and” and 
“or”, not just for “atomic” propositions, without such connectives. For example, the 
conjunctive proposition that Obama will win the election and Apple stocks will 
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increase in value on Election Day has a verifiable truth-value, just as each individual 
conjunct does. So, we can easily design tradable bets on such conjunctive 
propositions too. 
The aggregate beliefs generated through prediction markets may differ from those that 
would result from direct elicitation of individual beliefs. On the one hand, such 
discrepancies need not be a bad thing. Prediction markets may generate incentives for 
the best-informed individuals to participate, because they are more likely than others 
to expect a profit, especially if they have private information relevant to the 
propositions on which they are betting. So, prediction markets may be good at 
“extracting” dispersed information from a collective. On the other hand, prediction 
markets can be vulnerable to bubbles as much as ordinary financial markets are, and 
decisions to buy and sell bets may reflect beliefs about other participants’ beliefs as 
much as they reflect beliefs about the propositions at hand. 
2.3 Strategy-proof aggregation 
Strictly speaking, there is an element of behavioural aggregation even in the way we 
operationalize direct aggregation through voting or opinion polling. Since we never 
have direct access to people’s attitudes – we cannot look directly into their minds – 
we must always rely on what people tell us about their attitudes, through votes or 
speech acts more generally. Whether people’s expressed attitudes match their true 
attitudes depends on a variety of factors, such as whether they have an incentive to 
misrepresent their attitudes in order to swing the aggregate attitudes in a direction 
they consider advantageous. 
A key question in the theory of mechanism design in economics is how to design 
aggregation rules or more generally institutional mechanisms – both in the 
operationalization of direct aggregation and in behavioural aggregation – so as to 
incentivize individuals to reveal their attitudes truthfully. An aggregation rule is 
called strategy-proof if it has the property of inducing truthfulness. It is called 
manipulable or vulnerable to strategic behaviour otherwise (for discussions, see, e.g., 
Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975, Dietrich and List 2007, List and Pettit 2011, ch. 5). 
For example, the median rule in direct aggregation, under which the aggregate 
attitude is the median of the individual attitudes (on some commonly accepted linear 
scale), is known to be strategy-proof under plausible assumptions (e.g., Moulin 1980, 
Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti 1993). By contrast, the plurality rule, under which the 
aggregate attitude is the attitude held by the largest number of individuals, is 
vulnerable to strategic behaviour when there are three or more possible attitudes on a 
given issue, say attitudes A, B, and C. An individual whose attitude is not one of the 
two most frequently supported ones (say he or she has attitude C, while A and B are 
the “front-runners”) might strategically express his or her support for attitude B, in 
order to prevent A (which he or she supports less than B) from being declared the 
aggregate attitude.  
2.4 The roles played by aggregate attitudes 
Although aggregate attitudes may sometimes be very important, such as in elections 
or high-stakes polls, they need not play any direct social roles within the collectives to 
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which they are ascribed. They are, in the first place, shorthand summaries of the 
underlying individual attitudes and need not generally be action-guiding for the 
collective or its members. Aggregate attitudes can of course play important roles 
indirectly, for example when a third party acts on their basis, or when there is some 
institutional structure in which they play a specified role, or when they are salient in 
the individuals’ eyes. In each of these cases, however, it is only in the presence of 
some additional conditions (the actions of a third party, the presence of a particular 
institutional structure, a social norm or criterion of salience) that aggregate attitudes 
may attain a special functional role.   
Indeed, the collective in question need not be engaged in any joint activities at all, let 
alone conceptualize itself as a group. We can unproblematically ascribe aggregate 
attitudes to a statistical collective, even though its members share nothing but some 
demographic attribute, such as the date of birth in the case of a particular generation.  
The purpose of ascribing aggregate attitudes to a collective depends on the interests of 
whoever makes that ascription. The purpose could be descriptive: to give a maximally 
accurate or representative description of individual attitudes, as in an opinion poll or 
election. Or it could be revelatory: to extract as much information as possible from 
individual attitudes, as in a prediction market or in a scientific community, where we 
seek to “harvest” the wisdom of the crowd. In either case, whoever makes the 
ascription is the primary user of the ascribed aggregate attitudes.   
2.5 The relationship to individual attitudes 
Aggregate attitudes relate to individual attitudes in a very straightforward manner. 
The aggregate attitude on any proposition p is simply a suitable function of the 
corresponding individual attitudes on p or, at most, of individual choices or betting 
dispositions concerning p. In this sense, Quinton’s comment that “[t]o ascribe mental 
predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its 
members” is true of aggregate attitudes. Slightly more formally expressed: 
Propositionwise supervenience: The collective (here aggregate) attitude 
on any proposition p supervenes on (is determined by) individual attitudes 
(or betting dispositions) on p. 
There cannot be a difference in a given group’s aggregate attitude on a proposition 
that is not directly traceable to a difference in individual attitudes (or betting 
dispositions) on the same proposition. It cannot happen, for example, that a group 
comes to believe p in aggregate due to changes in individual attitudes unrelated to p. 
Thus we may say that aggregate attitudes are straightforwardly “reducible” to 
underlying individual attitudes (on the notion of propositionwise supervenience, see 
also List and Pettit 2006 and 2011, ch. 3).  
It should be clear that the supervenience relation holds only relative to a given 
aggregation rule. Once we have settled on the majority rule, for example, the 
aggregate attitude on p straightforwardly supervenes on individual attitudes on p. By 
contrast, it would be a mistake to think that there is a fact about what a group’s 
aggregate attitude on p is, independently of the aggregation rule. The political 
scientist William Riker famously emphasized this dependence of aggregate attitudes 
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on the aggregation rule when he argued that there is no such thing as the “will of the 
people”, independently of the voting procedure used to generate it (Riker 1982). 
Of course, the social-choice-theoretic literature contains not only aggregation rules 
respecting propositionwise supervenience (technically often called “propositionwise 
independence”), but also many rules violating it. For example, as is well known, if we 
vote only on some of the propositions – the “premises” – and derive the collective 
attitudes on others – the “conclusions” – by logical inference, then the collective 
attitude on each conclusion will depend not only on the individual attitudes on the 
conclusion but also on individual attitudes on the entire set of premises. The 
supervenience base for the resulting collective attitudes will then be considerably 
broader than propositionwise supervenience permits.  
While such aggregation rules are well-motivated in many contexts, it is unclear 
whether the collective attitudes they generate are best interpreted as aggregate 
attitudes in the present sense or whether they are better viewed as coherent 
corrections of such attitudes, or as attitudes the group might rationally endorse if it 
were to act as an agent in its own right. If so, these non-propositionwise-independent 
aggregation rules are better seen as producers of potential corporate attitudes, as 
discussed below, rather than as producers of mere aggregate attitudes. 
2.6 Rationality and group agency 
As should be clear, the ascription of an aggregate attitude to a collective carries no 
ontological commitment to a group agent, over and above the individual agents of 
which the collective consists. So, since aggregate attitudes are not held by a single 
agent but are summaries of different agents’ attitudes, we should not be surprised if 
they lack the coherence we expect a rational agent’s attitudes to display. An opinion 
poll sample is not a unified agent, and hence it is no surprise if its attitudes turn out to 
be inconsistent.  
Table 1 shows a well-known example of inconsistent majority beliefs, resulting from 
consistent individual beliefs. Generally, the majority rule fails to guarantee 
consistency and deductive closure in the aggregate attitudes it produces, even if the 
underlying individual attitudes are consistent and deductively closed (e.g., List and 
Pettit 2002; for a broader survey, see List 2012).  
 p q p and q 
Individual 1 Believed  Believed Believed 
Individual 2 Believed Disbelieved Disbelieved 
Individual 3 Disbelieved Believed Disbelieved 
Majority Believed Believed Disbelieved 
Table 1: Inconsistent majority attitudes 
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Other aggregation rules may perform better with respect to securing consistency 
and/or deductive closure, but if aggregate attitudes (in the summative sense defined 
here) are consistent and deductively closed, this is a purely contingent matter and not 
something that is rationally required.   
Aggregate beliefs generated through prediction markets may be coherent as a 
byproduct of market incentives, but again this is a contingent point and not something 
required by rationality. The reason why market incentives may have this effect is that 
any violations of probabilistic coherence in the beliefs induced by market prices may 
correspond to opportunities for arbitrage. Such opportunities, in turn, should 
disappear when the market is in equilibrium.  
Suppose, for example, the price for a bet on some proposition p is x US$, where x is 
strictly between 0 and 1, and the price for a bet on not p is distinct from 1-x US$. If 
the latter price is less than 1-x US$, then a rational buyer can make a sure profit by 
buying both bets (on p and on not p) for a combined price of less than 1 US$ and yet 
be guaranteed a payoff of 1 US$ once the truth-value of p is known. This should not 
be possible in equilibrium. Similarly, if the price for a bet on not p is greater than 1-x 
US$, then a rational vendor should be able to make a sure profit by the following 
transaction: short-selling both bets (on p and on not p) for a combined price of less 
than their current market price but above 1 US$ and then repurchasing them back at a 
price of only 1 US$ once the truth-value of p is known and the winning bet is valued 
at 1 US$ while the losing bet is valued at 0 US$. Again, making such a sure profit 
should not be possible in equilibrium. Market pressures can thus induce probabilistic 
coherence in market beliefs, though this is a mere byproduct of market incentives, not 
an intrinsic requirement on aggregate beliefs.  
3. Common attitudes 
3.1 Definition 
It is time to move on to the second kind of collective attitude. A common attitude (of 
a collective) is an attitude held by all individual members of the collective, where 
their holding it is a matter of common awareness. More formally, this can be captured 
by the following sequence of clauses: 
(1) Every member of the collective holds the attitude. 
(2) Every member believes that every other member holds the attitude. 
(3) Every member believes that every other member believes that every other 
member holds the attitude. 
And so on. 
Clause (1) expresses the fact that all members hold the attitude. Clauses (2), (3), (4), 
and so on express the fact that this is a matter of common awareness. (A subtly 
stronger definition omits all occurrences of the word “other” in clauses (2), (3), (4), 
and so on.) Common attitudes, especially in the form of common knowledge, have 
been famously studied by Lewis in his classic book on “Convention” (1969) and by 
Aumann in his paper “Agreeing to disagree” (1976) (for more recent overviews, see 
Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2014 and Perea 2012). Gilbert (1989) also recognizes a 
form of collective belief that is a matter of common knowledge, which my present 
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definition of common attitudes resembles. To define common knowledge, simply take 
the attitude in the definition above to be knowledge that p and replace every 
occurrence of the word “believes” with the word “knows”. 
The notion of a common attitude also makes sense even if we think that common 
awareness should be defined differently, for example as a disposition rather than an 
infinite hierarchy of beliefs, or as a primitive (not further defined) notion, or in some 
other way. We would then have to replace clauses (2), (3), (4), and so on with our 
preferred alternative definition.  
The technical details are less relevant for present purposes than the observation that, 
unlike aggregate attitudes, which can be the statistical construct of an outside 
observer, common attitudes are an inherently social phenomenon. They are held by 
the members of the collective in common awareness of their holding them and 
arguably play a role in many joint activities, most notably the solution of coordination 
problems.  
3.2 The roles played by common attitudes 
To see how common attitudes, especially common beliefs, can be central to the 
solution of many coordination problems, consider the following well-known example 
(Halpern and Moses 1990, quoted in Halpern 1995). 
“Two divisions of an army are camped on two hilltops overlooking a 
common valley. In the valley awaits the enemy… [I]f both divisions 
attack the enemy simultaneously they will win the battle, whereas if only 
one division attacks it will be defeated… Neither general [in command] 
will decide to attack unless he is sure that the other will attack with him. 
The generals can only communicate by means of a messenger. Normally, 
it takes the messenger one hour to get from one encampment to the other. 
However, it is possible that he will get lost … or, worse yet, be captured 
by the enemy… How long will it take them to coordinate on an attack?” 
The problem is that sending the messenger from the first division to the second with 
an appropriate message, or vice versa, is not enough to give each division certainty 
that the other will attack. Even if the message is transmitted correctly and the second 
division learns about the intentions of the first, the first division cannot be sure that its 
message has actually been received, and hence its commanding general cannot know 
his counterpart’s beliefs. If the second division tries to address this problem by 
sending the messenger back with a confirmation, the first division will find out that its 
original message has been received, but now the second division will lack any 
knowledge about whether that confirmation has been successfully transmitted. It is 
easy to see that, no matter how often the messenger travels back and forth, it is 
impossible for the two generals to establish a common belief of their plans in this 
way. At every stage, only finitely many of the clauses (1), (2), (3), and so on in the 
definition of common belief are met. In the given scenario, a coordinated attack is 
simply not possible. 
Of course, the example is somewhat stylized, but structurally similar coordination 
problems, in which each member of a collective is willing to participate in a joint 
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activity if and only if other members participate as well, arise in many different 
settings (for an overview, see Chwe 2001). Revolutions and political campaigns are 
obvious examples. These activities cannot get off the ground without the right 
coordination. As in the coordinated-attack example, unilateral action would often be 
too costly for participants here, so that they may start the activity only once the 
relevant individuals’ intentions to participate are commonly known. Generally, 
common attitudes may be central in the switch from one equilibrium to another in a 
coordination game – say the switch from the status quo to a superior alternative – 
especially when the costs of coordination failure are high.  
Common attitudes also play a crucial role in sustaining and stabilizing many existing 
social practices. A key prerequisite of the power of many positions in society – such 
as the office of head of state or the office of judge – is that it is commonly known 
among the relevant parties who holds that position and what powers and 
responsibilities are associated with it. A president or judge who is not commonly 
recognized as such lacks the power associated with his or her role. Similarly, a 
banknote, or more generally a currency, owes its value to the common beliefs backing 
it up. Currencies that are no longer commonly believed to be valuable typically lose 
their value. These examples should illustrate that common attitudes are a ubiquitous 
glue of the social world. 
As Chwe (2001) and others (e.g., Ober 2008) have observed, the point of many rituals 
is precisely the generation of common beliefs – and not merely, as sometimes 
thought, the expression of certain values, identities, or emotions. A public 
inauguration of an office-holder generates in all members of the audience not only (1) 
the belief that the person in question now holds the office, but also (2) the belief that 
everyone else believes that this is the case, (3) the belief that everyone else believes 
that everyone else believes that this is the case, and so on. As Chwe notes, it is no 
accident that, in many ceremonies, participants stand in a circle and publicly observe 
each other when a significant declaration is made. Examples range from weddings 
and inauguration ceremonies to the signing of an international treaty. Here, the 
participants acquire not only a first-order attitude, such as a belief about the content of 
the ceremony, but also a sequence of higher-order beliefs, corresponding to common 
awareness of their sharing the belief in question.   
3.3 The relationship to individual attitudes 
Although common attitudes, unlike aggregate attitudes, show up directly in the beliefs 
of individuals about others’ attitudes and can play significant roles in social 
coordination, their relationship to individual attitudes is still relatively 
straightforward. A common attitude on some proposition p supervenes on more than 
just the individual attitudes on p, but it still supervenes on attitudes related to p, such 
as beliefs about other individuals’ attitudes on p. Therefore the supervenience base of 
common attitudes is still relatively “narrow”: 
Enriched propositionwise supervenience: The collective (here 
common) attitude on any proposition p supervenes on individual attitudes 
on p and individual beliefs about other individuals’ attitudes related to p, 
as detailed in clauses (1), (2), (3), and so on. 
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There can never be a difference in a group’s common attitude on a proposition that is 
not traceable either to a difference in individual attitudes on that proposition or to a 
difference in individual beliefs about other individuals’ attitudes related to the 
proposition. Common attitudes are thus still relatively straightforwardly “reducible” 
to underlying individual attitudes. Indeed, the definition of a common attitude I have 
given defines it solely in terms of a particular configuration of individual attitudes, 
namely the configuration specified by clauses (1), (2), (3), and so on. 
3.4 Non-reductionistic accounts of common attitudes  
In contrast to the “reductionistic” account of common attitudes that I have given, one 
could also give a rival “non-reductionistic” account. This could take one of at least 
two forms. First, one could take common attitudes to be marked by a distinct “mode” 
with which they are held; they could be “we”-attitudes, rather than “I”-attitudes. 
Second, one could take common attitudes to be held by a collective subject, which is 
brought into existence by certain joint activities or commitments of multiple 
individuals. Variants of these accounts can be found in the literature on the intentions 
underpinning joint actions (for a survey, see Schweikard and Schmid 2013; for further 
discussion, see Tuomela 2007).  
Searle’s account of the intentions behind joint actions is a variant of the first non-
reductionistic account. He suggests that joint actions are based on we-intentions. 
These are intentions held by individuals, but the “mode” with which they are held 
differs from the mode with which the individuals’ ordinary I-intentions are held. 
When we engage in a joint action with others, on this account, we form a special kind 
of we-intention, as distinct from our ordinary I-intentions. The capacity to form such 
we-intentions, Searle suggests, is central to our ability to engage in complex social 
interactions. (The idea of we-intentions goes back further to Sellars 1968, as 
discussed by Schweikard and Schmid 2013.) 
Gilbert’s account of the intentions underlying joint actions is a variant of the second 
non-reductionistic account. She suggests that joint actions involve “plural subjects”. 
Specifically, the individuals engaged in a joint action bring into existence a plural 
subject to which intentions can then be ascribed. On this picture, any joint action is 
performed by a collective that constitutes a plural subject, which is the bearer of the 
relevant intentions.  
Whatever the merits of these accounts (and I am oversimplifying them here, omitting 
important details and nuances), they correspond to very different approaches to 
explaining coordinated activities from the approach I have adopted. Although the 
roles that non-reductionistic attitudes are supposed to play in relation to joint action 
are similar to the roles that I have taken common attitudes of the reductionistic kind to 
play, they play these roles in very different ways. Searle’s and Gilbert’s non-
reductionistic attitudes are not ordinary attitudes of individuals held as a matter of 
common awareness, which function exactly like other individual attitudes, but they 
are something else: they are either distinct we-attitudes, held by individuals in a 
special, collectively oriented psychological mode, or they are attitudes held by a 
novel, plural subject, constituted by several participating individuals.  
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How do these two kinds of non-reductionistic attitudes fit into my taxonomy of 
different kinds of collective attitudes? As far as the “we-mode” account is concerned, 
one might in principle amend that taxonomy by defining a notion of “we-attitudes” 
distinct from both aggregate attitudes and corporate attitudes, whose role is still 
broadly analogous to that of common attitudes as I have defined them here. However, 
unlike common beliefs and commonly known preferences, such we-attitudes are less 
widely recognized in the social sciences, and it is an open question whether we need 
them in order to explain any social phenomena. That is why I have not (yet) included 
them in my taxonomy. (Plausibly, even Searle’s own theory of social construction – 
especially his account of how social facts are created via the collective acceptance of 
certain statuses of objects or persons – might be modified such that the role played by 
we-intentions is played by common intentions of a more reductionistic kind.)  
As far as the plural-subject account is concerned, attitudes ascribed to plural subjects 
seem more akin to what I call corporate attitudes in this paper: the kind of collective 
attitudes discussed in Section 4. It is not clear, however, that we need to invoke plural 
subjects to fill the functional role played by common attitudes in social coordination, 
given that there are some good social-scientific theories of how common attitudes of 
the present reductionistic kind do this job (for examples of such social-scientific 
theories, see Chwe 2001 and Perea 2012). Invoking a plural subject each time a group 
of individuals performs a joint action seems to give rise to an unnecessarily rich 
ontology of subjects. 
A third and structurally distinct non-reductionistic account, which I set aside in light 
of space limitations, is the joint-attention account discussed by Campbell (2005) and 
others. On this account, two or more individuals’ jointly attending to something is a 
psychologically primitive phenomenon whose role in relation to joint action is 
somewhat similar to that of common attitudes discussed here. Joint attention – unlike 
common attitudes, we-attitudes, or the attitudes of plural subjects – is a perceptual 
phenomenon. (For an overview, see Eilan et al. 2005.) 
3.5 Rationality and group agency 
Like aggregate attitudes, common attitudes, on my account, can occur in collectives 
that are not group agents. The only intentional agents needed for the existence of 
common attitudes are the individuals referred to in clauses (1), (2), (3), and so on. 
Nonetheless, because of the unanimitarian structure of common attitudes, some basic 
rationality conditions may be satisfied by common attitudes.  
Suppose the individual attitudes in clause (1) satisfy conditions such as consistency. 
Since common attitudes are by definition unanimously held within the relevant 
collective, the consistency of the individual attitudes will carry over to common 
attitudes: any attitudes that lie within the intersection of several individuals’ 
consistent attitudes will still be consistent. So, at least in a collective of formally 
rational individuals (individuals with consistent attitudes), the common attitudes, if 
any, will be formally rational too. This sets common attitudes apart from aggregate 
attitudes, where consistency is, at best, a contingent feature.  
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3.6 Falsely attributed common attitudes 
Before moving on to the third kind of collective attitude, it is worth noting a striking 
social phenomenon in the neighbourhood of common attitudes. There can be attitude 
structures that mimic common attitudes in their effects on social coordination, even 
though they rest on false attributions. Recall that a common attitude within a 
collective requires that: 
(1) Every member of the collective holds the attitude. 
(2) Every member believes that every other member holds the attitude. 
(3) Every member believes that every other member believes that every other 
member holds the attitude. 
And so on.  
Now imagine that clauses (2), (3), (4), and so on are met, while clause (1) is not. 
Depending on the details of the situation, the effects on social coordination may be 
the same as in the case of a real common attitude, where clause (1) is met, but the 
coordinated actions will be sustained by false attitude attributions. The presence of 
falsely attributed common attitudes may be one of the reasons why certain bad social 
behaviours – such as the wide cooperation with a unanimously hated political regime 
or the compliance with harmful social norms – can persist despite a private lack of 
support. 
The present phenomenon is related to what social psychologists call “pluralistic 
ignorance”: “a psychological state characterized by the belief that one’s private 
attitudes and judgments are different from those of others, even though one’s public 
behavior is identical” (Prentice and Miller 1993, p. 244; Miller and McFarland 1987; 
see also Chwe 2001). On university campuses, for instance, students believe that 
others are more comfortable with high levels of alcohol consumption than they 
themselves are (e.g., Prentice and Miller 1993). Excessive social drinking may persist 
even though many of the participants privately dislike this practice. Similarly, a 
survey in the United States suggested that “in 1968 most white American adults 
grossly exaggerated the support among other whites for racial segregation” 
(O’Gorman 1975, p. 313), thereby falsely attributing racist attitudes to one another. 
If my earlier discussion of the role of common attitudes in social coordination is 
correct, we should expect that, when a falsely attributed common attitude unravels, 
this will facilitate a switch from a bad social equilibrium to a better alternative. 
Protests against repressive political regimes may become easier once people cease to 
attribute to each other the false common belief that the regime has wide support. A 
few individuals’ publicly observable admission that the emperor has no clothes may 
sometimes be enough to prompt a collapse in the hierarchy of beliefs described by 
clauses (2), (3), (4), and so on, when clause (1) is in fact not met. Falsely attributed 
common attitudes should therefore be less robust to certain informational shocks than 
genuine common attitudes, other things being equal. It is no surprise that repressive 
political regimes often place restrictions on the use of public spaces or public 
communication that may facilitate the generation of common attitudes not controlled 
by the rulers. 
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In a widely cited sociological study, Mackie (1996) offers an analysis of two harmful 
social practices as equilibria in coordination games: female footbinding, which was 
common in China for about 1000 years, and female genital mutilation, which still 
occurs in some parts of the world today. What originally led to those practices and to 
what extent falsely attributed common attitudes sustained them are difficult questions, 
but Mackie makes a claim that is highly relevant to the present discussion. He argues 
that, in the successful Chinese campaign to end footbinding, “[t]he pivotal innovation 
was to form associations of parents who pledged not to footbind their daughters nor 
let their sons marry footbound women” (p. 999). Pledges were made publicly, 
generating common beliefs among the participants that they had renounced the 
practice, thereby facilitating an equilibrium switch. Mackie suggests that public 
pledges may similarly help end the practice of female genital mutilation today. In a 
subsequent paper, he gives evidence from Senegal suggesting that a number of 
villages had indeed used that method to end the practice (Mackie 2000). 
The issues are obviously complex, but it should be clear that common attitudes, both 
genuine ones and even falsely attributed ones, can play central roles in equilibrium 
selection problems within collectives. 
4. Corporate attitudes 
4.1 Definition 
The third kind of collective attitude is the least “reducible” kind. A corporate attitude 
(of a collective) is an attitude held by the collective as an intentional agent. To say 
that a collective holds a corporate belief or desire in some proposition p is to say that 
the collective is an agent in its own right, which holds that belief or desire. Thus not 
all collectives are capable of holding corporate attitudes; only those that qualify as 
group agents are. 
For example, the United States Supreme Court and other collegial courts arguably fall 
into this category, as do commercial corporations, NGOs, and other purposive 
organizations such as cohesive political parties, universities, and especially states. In 
consequence, they are capable of holding corporate attitudes. By contrast, a random 
collection of individuals, such as the people who happen to be on Times Square at a 
particular time, does not. Such a collection cannot hold corporate attitudes. 
4.2 What is an intentional agent? 
To define a group agent, it is best to begin with a general definition of an intentional 
agent, not restricted to the case of groups (List and Pettit 2011, ch. 1). In the simplest 
terms, an intentional agent is a system, located in some environment, which has 
• beliefs about what its environment is like; 
• desires or goals about what it would like to achieve in its environment; and 
• a capacity to act in its environment, so as to pursue its desires or goals in line 
with its beliefs. 
Typical human beings easily fit this definition. But so do cats, dogs, and chimpanzees, 
although they are agents of a less complex sort. The contents of their attitudes and 
	   15 
their agential capacities are simpler than in the human case, but they are nonetheless 
systems with beliefs about the environment, desires or goals they seek to pursue, and 
a capacity to act in line with their beliefs and desires.  
Unless we endorse some form of human or biological “essentialism” about agency, 
we have no reason to think that humans or biological animals are the only creatures 
capable of satisfying the present definition of agency. The definition is deliberately 
thin and general. For example, it does not specify how complex the beliefs and desires 
must be for a system to qualify as an agent. The fact that there can be some trivial 
cases of agents such as thermostats (which might be said to have beliefs and desires 
about the temperature and to act by regulating the heating) need not worry us here. 
Also, the definition is not loaded with any metaphysical requirements about 
consciousness, first-person experiences, or the like. Finally, the definition is entirely 
positive, not normative. It is completely silent on the relationship between intentional 
agency in a thin descriptive sense and the normative status of any system. 
Given all this, there is nothing, in principle, that would prevent a sufficiently 
sophisticated robot or other non-biological system from qualifying as an intentional 
agent in the present sense. Similarly, a suitably organized collective can qualify as an 
agent too. A group agent is a collection of individuals that is organized in such a way 
as to have beliefs, desires or goals, and a capacity to act, through the contributions of 
its members, so as to pursue its desires or goals in accordance with its beliefs (List 
and Pettit 2006 and 2011, drawing on Pettit 2001, ch. 5, and 2003a; for other accounts 
of group agency, see, e.g., French 1984 and Tollefsen 2002a,b; on the relationship 
between joint action and group agency, see also Pettit and Schweikard 2006).  
The beliefs and desires of a group agent – i.e., its corporate attitudes – are held, not by 
the individuals, but by the group as an agential system in its entirety. This is 
analogous to the way in which an individual human’s beliefs and desires are held, not 
by any single part of his or her brain and body, such as a particular set of neurons, but 
by the individual as a whole, in his or her capacity as an agent. 
At first, one might worry that the present definition of corporate attitudes is circular. 
Corporate attitudes are the attitudes of a group agent, and a group agent, in turn, is a 
collective that holds such attitudes. But there is no circularity here. If we understand 
intentional attitudes such as beliefs and desires in functionalist terms – defining them 
in terms of the functional role they play in an agent, not in terms of their metaphysical 
nature (see, e.g., Jackson and Pettit 1988) – then an agent’s beliefs are simply those 
states of the agent whose functional role is to represent certain features of the 
environment. Its desires are those states whose functional role is to depict a target 
specification of the environment, perhaps a specification of the agent in relation to its 
environment (e.g., the agent’s target of acquiring some food). And the agent’s 
capacity to act is the capacity to intervene in the world, for instance through 
movement or speech, in response to the agent’s belief states and desire states. The 
beliefs and desires of a group agent are thus whichever states of the organized 
collective play the relevant functional roles. For example, an organization’s beliefs 
and desires related to the pursuit of a particular project are simply the states of the 
organization – configurations of individual members, processes, and so on – that play 
the functional role of guiding the organization’s actions in pursuit of the project in 
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question. Typically, the beliefs and desires of an organization will be generated 
through certain decision-making procedures, such as relevant committees or boards. 
Whether or not a given collective qualifies as a group agent depends on how it is 
organized: its organizational structure, decision-making procedures, and so on. Only 
sufficiently structured collectives are candidates for group agency, including some of 
the examples mentioned above, from commercial corporations to collegial courts. 
Random collectives lack the required organizational structure and hence cannot 
generate corporate beliefs and desires. 
4.3 The roles played by corporate attitudes 
As evident from the definition of corporate attitudes, the roles played by corporate 
beliefs and desires in a group agent are exactly the same as the roles played by 
ordinary beliefs and desires in any agent. They are simply the attitudes governing the 
agent’s actions. A group agent – if formally rational – acts in accordance with its 
corporate beliefs and desires, not in accordance with those of any of its individual 
members. Thus corporate attitudes come with an inbuilt social role: they are the 
intentional attitudes of the collective as an agent. 
The ways in which corporate attitudes are generated within a group’s organizational 
structure and lead to the group’s actions, through the contributions of its members, 
may differ significantly from group to group. The US Supreme Court, Apple, and the 
United Kingdom may each be group agents, and yet they are organized in very 
different ways. This mirrors the point that differently engineered robots may be based 
on different hardware and software encoding their belief-and-desire states and 
governing their interaction with the environment.  
4.4 The relationship to individual attitudes 
Unlike aggregate and common attitudes, corporate attitudes are not straightforwardly 
reducible to individual attitudes. Conceptually, there is no reason to think that, for a 
particular state of an organized collective to function as an action-guiding belief-and-
desire state, it must be the case that the individual members share a matching belief-
and-desire state (List and Pettit 2011). Indeed, different group members may 
contribute in different ways to the formation of the group’s beliefs and desires and to 
the pursuit of its goals, where each individual shares at most a commitment to some 
“sub-plan” (on planning agency, see also Bratman 2014). 
In fact, it can be shown that a group agent’s attitudes on each proposition in question 
could not generally be a function of individual attitudes on the same proposition. To 
illustrate, recall that if the group’s attitudes were generated by majority rule, they 
would not generally be consistent, as shown in Table 1 above. Thus the majority 
attitudes could not generally serve as a basis for rational agency at the collective level. 
(As discussed below, a modicum of rationality is a necessary condition for group 
agency.) To achieve consistent corporate attitudes, consistency-restoring deviations 
from the majority attitudes may be necessary, for instance by overruling the majority 
attitudes on some propositions in order to respect the logical implications of the 
majority attitudes on others. In the example of Table 1, we might generate consistent 
corporate attitudes by accepting the majority attitudes on propositions p and q and 
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deriving the corporate attitude on their conjunction by logical implication. The 
resulting attitude on the conjunction p and q would then no longer be the majority 
attitude on that proposition.  
This point generalizes. Except in special cases, no aggregation rule can robustly 
secure consistent and complete corporate attitudes on a set of interconnected 
propositions and also make the collective attitude on every proposition a function of 
the individual attitudes on the same proposition (List and Pettit 2006, 2011). More 
formally, propositionwise supervenience, as introduced above, is not generally 
consistent with robust group rationality, the requirement of consistent and complete 
corporate attitudes across variations in underlying individual attitudes. This supports:  
Holistic supervenience: The collective (here corporate) attitude on any 
proposition p supervenes on the individual attitudes across a web of 
interconnected propositions and/or other non-attitudinal contributions by 
the individuals. 
The relationship between (i) corporate attitudes and (ii) individual attitudes or non-
attitudinal contributions is similar to the relationship between (i) mental states and (ii) 
their neural realizers in the brain, according to non-reductive physicalism. The 
relationship is one of supervenience without reducibility. In the social-individual case, 
just as in the mind-body case, (i) supervenes on (ii), but (i) is not reducible to (ii). For 
this reason, the present view about the status of corporate attitudes may be described 
as a form of non-reductive individualism (Sawyer 2002, 2003), non-redundant group-
agency realism (List and Pettit 2011), or type holism together with supervenience 
individualism (List and Spiekermann 2013). 
4.5 Rationality and group agency 
As we have seen, corporate attitudes can occur only in collectives that qualify as 
agents. So, the ascription of a corporate attitude to a collective, unlike the ascription 
of an aggregate attitude or a common attitude, carries an ontological commitment to a 
group agent. 
Moreover, it is an essential requirement on corporate attitudes that they satisfy certain 
requirements of rationality (though these need not be unrealistically demanding). To 
begin with, a group agent, like any intentional agent, is subject to certain rationality 
requirements. However, these are essential not just from the practical perspective of 
good functioning, as with any agent. They are also a key prerequisite for justifying the 
ascription of group agency in the first place (for a related discussion, see Pettit 
2003b). A collective qualifies as a group agent only if its collective pattern of 
behaviour can be explained, or “rationalized”, as being belief-desire-driven in a 
sufficiently systematic way. A collective whose behaviour is not “rationalizable” in 
this way is normally best interpreted, not as an irrational group agent, but as a non-
agential collective, where there is no reason to expect any rational attitudes at all. 
It is generally accepted that, unless a system (whether biological, physical, or social) 
exhibits at least a modicum of rationality, we are not warranted in ascribing 
intentional agency to it, unless there are mitigating circumstances (see, e.g., Dennett 
1987 on the conditions under which we may take an “intentional stance” towards a 
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system). But in the case of individual human beings, there is an independent 
presumption of intentional agency, based on what we know about humans in general. 
We tend to qualify or abandon the hypothesis that a particular human person is an 
intentional agent only in the face of persistent, globally irrational behaviour, for 
example, due to severe psychological or neurological disorders. By contrast, in the 
case of groups, the burden of proof is on those who defend the hypothesis that a 
particular group is an intentional agent, not on those who think that the group lacks 
agency and hence cannot be expected to hold rational corporate attitudes. (On a 
Dennett-style interpretation of groups as bearers of intentional attitudes, see also 
Tollefsen 2002b.)  
As a result, there is no justification for viewing a group as an agent when its 
behaviour is not sufficiently compatible with the hypothesis that the group acts in a 
systematic belief-desire-driven way. When we look at the chaotic behaviour in a 
stampede, for example, the best explanation is not one that invokes group agency, but 
one that interprets the stampede as a catastrophic byproduct of individual interactions. 
In the same way, we would not ascribe intentional agency to the snow in an avalanche 
or to a volcano that is erupting; these are simply not agential phenomena. 
This is not to say that the rationality requirements on group agents should be more 
demanding than those on individuals. We know from many studies in psychology and 
behavioural economics that most individual human beings display certain deviations 
from the classical requirements of rationality. These range from susceptibility to 
framing and nudging, cyclical choice behaviour, and various forms of dynamic 
inconsistency to fallacies of reasoning, such as conjunction fallacies, base rate 
fallacies, and so on. Crucially, however, the typical deviations are local ones; they do 
not undermine the folk-psychological picture of humans as intentional agents, with a 
belief-desire psychology. Similarly, sufficiently local deviations from the 
requirements of rationality do not undermine the ascription of intentional agency to an 
organized collective. Global irrationality, by contrast, does. (On the rationality 
requirements on group agents, see also List and Pettit 2012, specifically the response 
to Gaus’s criticism.) 
The present paper is not the place to defend the possibility of group agency or to 
comment on the organizational designs that might support it. For a detailed account, 
see List and Pettit (2011). Here I simply wish to note that the conditions for the 
ascription of corporate attitudes to a group are closely tied to the conditions that 
warrant the ascription of intentional agency to it, which include the satisfaction of 
certain rationality requirements. Corporate attitudes are fundamentally different in 
this respect from both aggregate and common attitudes, whose ascription does not 
presuppose any requirements of rationality. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The three kinds of collective attitudes I have discussed – aggregate, common, and 
corporate ones – are genuinely distinct and, in fact, almost logically independent. 
Lesson 1: An aggregate attitude need not involve either a common 
attitude or a corporate attitude.  
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As we have seen, aggregate attitudes can be ascribed to non-agential collectives and 
even to collectives that do not view themselves as groups. Consequently, none of the 
richer social phenomena associated with common attitudes or corporates attitudes 
need to be present for the ascription of aggregate attitudes to make sense.  
Lesson 2: A common attitude need not involve a corporate attitude, and, 
in the related case of a falsely attributed common attitude, it need not 
even involve an aggregate attitude. (The italicized qualification is the 
reason for my claim that the three kinds of collective attitudes are only 
almost independent.)  
Since group agency is not a requirement for the ascription of common attitudes, a 
collective can have common attitudes in the absence of any corporate attitudes. And 
while genuine common attitudes are always unanimously held – and will therefore be 
aligned with some underlying aggregate attitudes – falsely attributed common 
attitudes can come apart from the relevant aggregate attitudes. It is possible for all 
members of some collective to believe that the emperor has no clothes, and yet for the 
individuals to attribute to one another a false common belief that the emperor has 
beautiful clothes. Here the group’s aggregate attitude would be distinct from its 
falsely attributed common attitude. 
Lesson 3: A corporate attitude need not involve either an aggregate 
attitude or a common attitude. 
Due to the failure of propositionwise supervenience, a group’s corporate attitude on a 
proposition need not be a function of its members’ individual attitudes on the same 
proposition, and hence it need not coincide with whatever the aggregate attitude on 
that proposition may be. It is even possible for a group agent to have corporate 
attitudes on propositions that many, even most, group members are unaware of. A 
state, for example through its intelligence services, may have action-guiding corporate 
attitudes on a variety of propositions that have never crossed the minds of most 
citizens. Similar points are true of other complex organizations. A fortiori, the 
existence of a corporate attitude on a proposition need not presuppose a common 
attitude on that proposition. Even if it is a matter of common awareness among the 
members of a group that this group is an agent, with a particular organizational 
structure, the group’s corporate attitudes need not be a matter of common awareness.  
I conclude by summarizing the key features of the three kinds of collective attitudes 
in Table 2. 
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 Aggregate attitudes Common attitudes Corporate attitudes 
Functional 
role played in 
a collective 
No direct functional 
role, at most an 
indirect one 
Can play an 
important role in 
social coordination 
Action-guiding for 




attitudes or betting 





on each proposition 
in question, plus 
beliefs about 
others’ attitudes 
Much broader: webs 





















but satisfied by 




essential for the 




No No Yes 
Table 2: Key features of the three kinds of collective attitudes 
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